

RAND

*The Retirement-Consumption
Puzzle: A Marital Bargaining
Approach*

Shelly Lundberg

Richard Startz

Steven Stillman

DRU-2506-NICHD

February 2001

Labor and Population Program

Working Paper Series 01-04

The RAND unrestricted draft series is intended to transmit preliminary results of RAND research. Unrestricted drafts have not been formally reviewed or edited. The views and conclusions expressed are tentative. A draft should not be cited or quoted without permission of the author, unless the preface grants such permission.

20010712 036

**The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle:
A Marital Bargaining Approach**

**Shelly Lundberg
Richard Startz
Steven Stillman***

February 2001

* Department of Economics, University of Washington (Lundberg and Startz) and RAND (Stillman). We are indebted to Jonathan Skinner, Dan Hamermesh, Jan Ondrich, and seminar participants at the University of British Columbia, Washington University, the University of Washington, and RAND for helpful comments, but remain responsible for all errors and omissions. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Institute on Aging (Lundberg and Startz) and the National Institute on Child Health and Human Development (Stillman).

© Lundberg, Startz, and Stillman 2001. All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

Evidence from several countries reveals a substantial drop in household consumption around the age of retirement that is difficult to explain with life-cycle models. Using food consumption data from more than 550 households from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the years 1979 – 1986 & 1989 – 1992, we find that married couple households decrease their expenditures on both food consumed at home and away from home by about 8 percent following the retirement of the male household head. This result is robust for several alternative definitions of retirement. No significant decrease in consumption is found for single households, either in a sample of males or a pooled sample of single males and females. These results are consistent with a model of marital bargaining in which wives prefer to save more than their husbands to support an expected longer retirement period, and relative control over household decisions is affected by control over market income.

I. Introduction

Households appear to reduce their consumption expenditures substantially around the age of retirement. This pattern has been documented for the U.S. by Hamermesh [1984], Mariger [1987], and Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg [1997], for Canada by Robb and Burbridge [1989], and for the U.K. by Banks, Blundell, and Tanner [1998]. The consumption decline appears to be fairly widespread across consumption categories, rather than concentrated on work-related expenses, and to take the form of a discrete drop at the year of retirement.

This behavior is puzzling, since life-cycle consumption models predict that households will want to smooth consumption (or rather, the marginal utility of consumption) when they experience a predictable drop in income, as at retirement. After examining alternative explanations that are consistent with forward-looking life-cycle behavior, other researchers have attributed this consumption drop to myopic behavior or to the systematic arrival of discouraging information at retirement. Understanding the cause of the consumption drop at retirement is important both to researchers who are trying to understand how individuals make complex decisions when the future is uncertain and to policy makers who are concerned about the adequacy of retirement savings by the baby boom generation.

In this paper, we explore an empirical hypothesis suggested by a collective model of household behavior. If married couple households make decisions collectively (for example, by cooperative bargaining), and their ability to make binding agreements into the future is limited, then current consumption and savings decisions may be affected by each spouse's current control over resources. Most wives expect to live several years longer than their husbands, and therefore

prefer, absent perfect altruism, to consume less as the couple ages than husbands do. If the husband's bargaining power depends upon his current income or employment status, retirement from a career job will cause a relative deterioration in his influence on household decisions and a decline in the couple's consumption spending.

This story generates a testable hypothesis: we should see a consumption drop at retirement for married couple households, but not for single households who, though they also experience a drop in income, can be expected to act in a way that is consistent with life-cycle utility maximization by the unitary consumer. We also expect the consumption drop to be more pronounced for couples with more divergent interests—i.e. for couples in which the husband is substantially older than his wife. We use food consumption data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the years 1979 – 1986 & 1989 – 1992 to test these hypothesis and find that expenditures drop at retirement by 8 to 10 percent for married couples, but do not decrease significantly for single households. The magnitude of the consumption drop is increasing in the relative age of the husband. These results are robust with respect to alternative specifications of the consumption equation and definitions of retirement, and lend some support to a collective rather than unitary approach to the decisions of older couples.

II. Literature Review

Household income falls substantially with retirement, and consumption expenditures fall as well. Yet standard economic models suggest that consumption should be smoothed over periods of predictably high and low income, and the permanent loss of income due to retirement is, for most, quite predictable as to both timing and magnitude. More formally, it is the marginal

utility of consumption that should be held constant over the life-cycle, and changes coincident with retirement in family size, health, and work-related expenses, or interactions between leisure and goods consumption, could in principle allow the observed drop in consumption to be reconciled with the standard life-cycle model. Two recent studies have examined the retirement-consumption puzzle in the United States and the United Kingdom and assessed these alternative explanations, but conclude that a substantial proportion of the drop in consumption remains unexplained.

Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (BBT) [1998] use synthetic cohort data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey for households whose heads were born between 1911 and 1926. They estimate a consumption growth equation and find an unexplained dip in consumption growth that begins about age 60. Allowing for changes in mortality risk across cohorts results in little change in the predicted consumption path, and the declines in non-durable consumption are not restricted to goods likely to be work-related (transport and clothing), but also appear among “basic necessities,” including food consumed at home. To examine whether the marginal utility of consumption changes with labor market status, BBT compare periods of unemployment to retirement. They find, surprisingly, that the unemployed smooth consumption to a greater extent than the retired when income falls, though unanticipated declines in wealth should be much less prevalent among the retired. Therefore, increased leisure does not appear to account for the retirement consumption decline. BBT conclude that “... the only way to reconcile fully the fall in consumption with the life-cycle hypothesis is with the systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information.”

Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (BSW) [2000] attempt to explain the large variations in savings and accumulated wealth among households with similar lifetime resources. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, they compare the actual relationship between accumulated wealth and the consumption profile to those derived from simple models of life-cycle decision-making. BSW find negligible declines for the wealthiest households, but discontinuities of more than 30 percent for households in the lowest wealth quartile. They find that the observed relationships between accumulated wealth, consumption changes before and after retirement, and the consumption drop at retirement are not consistent with the predicted behavior of rational, farsighted agents. With respect to the consumption decline at retirement they find, as do BBT, that work-related expenses do not account for the drop, and that unanticipated shocks leading to early retirement do not appear to be the cause. Their conclusion is similar to that of BBT:

These findings are difficult to interpret in the context of the life cycle model. While it may be possible to formulate some model of rational life cycle planning that would account for our findings, in our view the empirical patterns in this paper are more easily explained if one steps outside the framework of rational, farsighted optimization. (p. 30)

The conventional approach to household decision-making about retirement and savings is to assume that the household consists of a single individual (with a well-defined “age” and “health status”). In this context, there are only three ways to explain the sharp drop in consumption in response to the anticipated event of retirement: a fall in the marginal utility of consumption due to increased leisure, the systematic arrival of unpleasant surprises, or some type of irrationality or myopia. A number of models that can explain dynamic inconsistencies in behavior have been introduced, including the hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson [1997] and Akerlof’s model of procrastination [1991]. More specifically, Diamond and Koszegi [2000]

suggest that the observed downward jump in consumption at retirement may be accounted for by quasi-hyperbolic discounting with naive agents, where earlier “selves” restrict savings to discourage early retirement, but later “selves” decide to retire anyway.

The sharp drop in consumption at retirement appears to be inconsistent with the simple life-cycle model of the individual consumer, and with modifications of that model that take into account nonseparabilities between goods and leisure in consumption and other complications.¹ Rejecting this model in favor of single agent behavioral models that can generate dynamic inconsistencies in behavior is one possible response; an alternative would be to recognize that most households approaching retirement contain at least two members, and that decision-making with multiple agents need not conform to the simplest version of the life-cycle model.

III. Theory

In a collective model of household behavior, husbands and wives make joint decisions while attempting to maximize individual utility functions. Chiappori [1988,1992] analyzes a general framework in which household allocations are assumed to be efficient, and this implies the existence of a “sharing rule” that divides total household resources among individual members. The sharing rule itself is not determined within the model, but it is described as a function of individual incomes. The determinants of relative bargaining power are discussed more explicitly in cooperative bargaining models, which are special cases of the general

¹ Browning and Crossley [2000] argue that the average welfare loss associated with the unexplained consumption dip at retirement is small, but that more research on the distribution of these dips, and their correlation with wealth levels, is needed.

collective model. In “divorce threat” models², the sharing of household resources depends upon a threat point that corresponds to the husband’s and wife’s best options outside the marriage. The bargaining power of each spouse will be a function of the public and private resources available to divorced men and women, and on conditions in the remarriage market. In the “separate spheres” model³, the threat point is internal to the marriage, and is determined by an inefficient noncooperative marital equilibrium. In this case, measures of control over resources within the marriage will be the determinants of relative bargaining power.

Dynamic models of marital bargaining are rare, and the determinants of bargaining power, or of changes in bargaining power, tend to be discussed rather informally. We do not present here a formal model that analyzes changes in a couple’s “sharing rule” over the course of their marriage, but examine the implications for observed behavior if bargaining power changes with retirement. Retirement of the husband from a career job may affect his relative power within the marriage not only because it cuts current income (and potential future income), but also through changes in control over non-monetary resources (e.g. an office), social networks, or status.⁴ A divorce threat model would emphasize the impact of retirement on the discounted stream of future income (the external option) and suggest a gradual decline in bargaining power as retirement approaches. In internal threat point models such as separate spheres, however, the current resources of husband and wife will affect bargaining in each period and a discrete change in bargaining power should occur with retirement.

² See McElroy and Horney [1981] and Manser and Brown [1980].

³ Lundberg and Pollak [1993].

⁴ If retirement changes relative bargaining power, anticipation of this effect should affect the choice of retirement date. For this analysis, however, we assume the timing of retirement to be exogenous.

In the standard intertemporal consumption model, a single individual maximizes the discounted present value of period-by-period utility. Here we extend the standard life-cycle model to include bargaining between husband and wife, following the discussion in Lundberg [1999].⁵ We assume that the relative bargaining power of husband and wife shifts with retirement and simplify to focus on two issues. Wives have longer life expectancies than husbands, and therefore prefer lower per period consumption in order to spread resources over their longer life. In the absence of a commitment mechanism within the family, this conflict of interest within the household can result in a discrete drop in consumption at the husband's retirement.⁶

A two-person household consisting of a husband and wife consumes a single public good, C , where flow utility is $U(C)$ for each spouse. We assume that there is no altruism, discounting, interest, nor uncertainty, and that there are three periods of fixed length T_1, T_2, T_3 . In the first period the husband works and the family receives annual income Y_1 . In the second period the couple consumes by drawing down assets. In the last period only the wife is alive. The husband's lifetime utility is $T_1U(C_1) + T_2U(C_2)$; the wife's lifetime utility is $T_1U(C_1) + T_2U(C_2) + T_3U(C_3)$. We begin with the assumption that commitment is possible, and that all bargaining takes place at the beginning of the dynamic program. The efficient outcome of family bargaining can be characterized by the maximization of a weighted average of

⁵ Other collective models of consumption and saving include Browning [2000], who shows that the time path of household consumption should depend on the distribution of income within the household, and Mazzocco [2000], who finds that the conventional Euler equation restriction on consumption is rejected for households with two decision-makers, but not for households with a single decision-maker.

⁶ The importance of a commitment mechanism in generating efficient intertemporal decisions by households is discussed in Lundberg and Pollak [2001].

husband's and wife's utility. The weight $0 < \mu < 1$ on the wife's utility reflects the relative bargaining power of husband and wife.

The optimization problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \max & (1-\mu)[T_1U(C_1)+T_2U(C_2)] + \mu[T_1U(C_1)+T_2U(C_2)+T_3U(C_3)] \\ \text{s.t. } & T_1C_1+T_2C_2+T_3C_3=T_1Y \end{aligned}$$

and the solution is characterized by $U'(C_1)=U'(C_2)=\mu U'(C_3)$. Consumption remains unchanged on retirement, and this result is independent of the relative bargaining power of husband and wife and relative life expectancies. Because the couple places less weight on consumption in widowhood, consumption drops in the final period.

We turn now to the problem without commitment. The problem is solved by period-by-period backward induction, which means that the weights placed on husband's and wife's utility may change each period. In the last period, the widow consumes all remaining assets; her utility will be $T_3U(C_3)$.⁷ In the second to last (retirement) period, the husband and wife maximize a weighted average of husband and wife's utility with wife's weight $0 < \mu_2 < 1$. Denoting assets at the beginning of the second period as A_2 , the optimization problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \max & (1-\mu_2)[T_2U(C_2)] + \mu_2[T_2U(C_2)+T_3U(C_3)] \\ \text{s.t. } & T_3C_3 = A_2 - T_2C_2 \end{aligned}$$

This implies that $U'(C_2)=\mu_2 U'(C_3)$ so, just as in the commitment case, consumption falls in widowhood.

⁷ Note that a bequest motive shared by husband and wife will reduce the conflict of interest over resources remaining in the final period.

Now turn to the first period where the family bargaining problem is

$$\begin{aligned} & \max (1-\mu_1)[T_1U(C_1)+T_2U(C_2)]+\mu_1[T_1U(C_1)+T_2U(C_2)+T_3U(C_3)] \\ & s.t. \quad U'(C_2)=\mu_2U'(C_3) \\ & \quad T_3C_3=A_2-T_2C_2 \\ & \quad A_2=(Y-C_1)T_1 \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to show that $C_2 < C_1$ iff $\mu_2 > \mu_1$.⁸ Therefore, if relative bargaining power shifts in favor of the wife when the husband retires, consumption will fall at retirement. Altruism or a bequest motive will tend to mitigate the extent of the disagreement between husband and wife, while an increase in the age gap will exacerbate it.⁹

How large will the drop in consumption be? To construct an example, it is useful to make the common assumption that the flow utility function is

$$U(C_t) \equiv \ln C_t$$

This gives us $U'(C_t) = 1/C_t$ and a little algebra shows

$$C_3 = \mu_2 C_2 \tag{1}$$

$$C_2 = \left(\frac{T_2 + T_3 \mu_1}{T_2 + T_3 \mu_2} \right) \cdot C_1 \tag{2}$$

⁸ The proof is presented in an appendix available from the authors.

⁹ There are some isolated pieces of evidence of a lack of consensus between husband and wife concerning saving for retirement. Euwals et al.[2000] find that, among Dutch couples, wives report saving for old age to be a more important priority than do their husbands. More dramatically, Aura [2000] documents the substantial effect of the Retirement Equity Act, which gave spouses of pension plan participants the right to survivor benefits unless they explicitly waived this right, on the likelihood that survivor benefits are rejected and on life insurance coverage.

$$C_1 = \frac{T_1}{T_1 + T_2 + T_3\mu_1} Y \quad (3)$$

Note that the extent of the change in consumption depends on the wife's relative preference for spreading out consumption--as $T_3 \rightarrow 0$ the consumption decline disappears. The length of the final period will depend upon the difference in life expectancy between the husband and wife, and on their relative ages. A man retiring at age 62 has a life expectancy of about 18 years ($T_2 = 18$). In our sample the average gender age gap is approximately 3 years. A women's life expectancy at age 59 is 24 years ($T_3 = 6$). If the wife's utility has a weight of $\mu_1 = .40$ before retirement and $\mu_2 = .60$ afterwards, then we predict a 5.7 percent drop in consumption at the husband's retirement. A change in bargaining power from $\mu_1 = .25$ to $\mu_2 = .75$ implies a 14 percent drop. Log utility may be an imperfect approximation, but this example helps to place an order of magnitude on the predicted drop in consumption

This theoretical model combined with the additional assumption that the husband's retirement reduces his relative bargaining power provides an explanation for why married couples experience a discrete drop in consumption expenditures after the husband retires. Since the results in this model are driven by the lack of a commitment mechanism within the family, and not by any sort of myopic or time-inconsistent behavior, households with a single member should not experience a drop in consumption after retirement. Thus, the bargaining model can be tested by comparing the behavior of married couples to singles.

IV. Empirical Model

Suppose now that couples differ only in their income. We can write the right hand side of equation (3) for the i^{th} couple as $\alpha_i = \ln \frac{T_1}{T_1 + T_2 + T_3 \mu_1} Y_i$. If we define $\gamma = \ln \left(\frac{T_2 + T_3 \mu_1}{T_2 + T_3 \mu_2} \right)$ then we have the following fixed effects equation for married couples:

$$\ln C_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma^* AFTER_{it} \quad (4)$$

where t indexes time, $\ln C_{it}$ equals either i) the log of total food expenditure; ii) the log of expenditure on food at home; or iii) the log of expenditure on food away from home, $AFTER_{it} = 1$ in all years after a couple retires and $= 0$ otherwise, and \tilde{a} equals the approximate percentage change in consumption after retirement. This change is negative if $\mu_2 > \mu_1$ and is decreasing in T_3 .

Equation (4) can be generalized to allow for single individuals as well as married couples; to allow the age, health status, and composition of each household to affect the marginal utility of consumption; and to allow households to make optimization errors. In the next section we report the results of estimating an equation of the following form:

$$\ln C_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta^* RETIRE_{it} + \gamma^* AFTER_{it} + X_{it} \beta + u_{it}, \quad (5)$$

where i indexes the individual (or couple), $RETIRE_{it} = 1$ in the year an individual (or couple) retires and $= 0$ otherwise, X_{it} includes other control variables, and u_{it} is a normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ_u^2 .¹⁰ In all specifications X_{it} includes a series of age dummy

¹⁰ We allow for a separate effect in the year of retirement because this may be a year of partial work and partial retirement.

variables to allow for a non-linear estimated age-consumption profile in each sample, and a series of household size dummy variables to allow for non-linear scale effects in household consumption per capita in each sample. Health status is also included as a control variable in some specifications.

V. Data

We examine the relationship between consumption behavior and retirement using food expenditure data reported by the representative SRC sample of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our sub-samples include unmarried individuals who are between the age of 45 and 70 on July 1st, 1979, and matched husband/wife pairs in which at least one member is in this age range. The sample period for the analysis is 1979-1986 and 1989-1992, and is determined by the availability of consumption data for the household and retirement status for both husbands and wives. These restrictions result in a sample of 986 married couples, 180 single men, and 325 single women.

The main dependent variable of our analysis is annual household food expenditure in 1985 dollars. Expenditures on food are used as a proxy for total consumption, since panel data on total consumption is not available.¹¹ This variable is the sum of two components: (1) Annual food expenditure for food used at home (excluding food purchased with food stamps); and (2) Annual food expenditure for meals away from home (excluding the amount spent on meals at work or at school). These two components are also analyzed separately. Observations in which either total food consumption or food consumption at home is reported to be zero are excluded

¹¹ See the discussion in Attanasio and Weber [1995] of the disadvantages of using food expenditures as a consumption proxy.

from the analysis.¹² Annual expenditure is calculated from a question of the form “How much do you spend on food in an average week?” and the timing of the consumption data relative to the dating of retirement presents some problems. The consumption question is likely to elicit information about current expenditures (around the time of the interview in March or April), while all other variables refer to the preceding year. This dating convention insures that consumption is measured after retirement.

Specifying the date at which retirement occurs also involves some measurement issues. Our main retirement definition is based on a retrospective question asked of all household heads and spouses: “In what year did you retire?”. This variable is asked each year a head or spouse is surveyed and the respondent is able to alter their answer from year to year. In our preferred specification, an individual’s year of retirement is calculated as the latest year in which they report retiring during our sample period, but we also consider alternative definitions based on reports of current work status and on actual hours worked.

We compare the consumption response of married couples to the retirement of the husband to the behavior of a sample of single men. Since the latter is a rather small sample, we also estimate all models on a pooled sub-sample of single men and women. Only individuals or married couples who retire during the sample period (including the years 1987, 1988, & 1993) are included in the analysis.¹³ In the case of married couples, “retirement” refers to the

¹² A few individuals report zero consumption in both food consumption categories. A larger number of individuals report zero food consumption away from home. To avoid biasing the sample by dropping these observations all zero values in this category are recoded to equal the log of consumption at the 1st percentile in the appropriate group defined by marital status and household size. The results are qualitatively similar when these observation are dropped instead.

¹³ All multivariate analysis is done using fixed effects regressions and thus excluding all individuals / couples who do not retire reduces the efficiency of the regressions but does not affect the consistency of the results. Furthermore,

retirement of the male household head, unless otherwise specified. Marriages, divorces, and deaths cause changes in the marital status of individuals during our sample period; households are allocated to a particular sub-sample on the basis of their retirement year marital status.¹⁴ In some specifications, we restrict the sample period to years in which marital status does not change.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sub-samples defined by retirement measure 1, which uses the latest year of reported retirement. A total of 553 households are included in the analysis using this definition, of which 391 are married couples, 36 are single males, and 126 are single females. An average of 11 years of data are available for each household providing a total of 6143 annual observations. The average age in each sub-sample is about one year less than the average retirement age, which is 62 for husbands, 61 for single men, and 64 for single women. Annual food expenditure is 34% higher for married couples than for single men and 37% higher for single men than for single women. Conforming to stereotype, single men spend more than twice as much on food away from home than single women and even more than married couples.

Four alternative measures of retirement are also used in the analysis. The first alternative measure (Measure 2) uses the retrospective retirement question described above, but defines an individual's year of retirement as the earliest year in which they report retiring. Individuals are also asked each year the following question about their current employment status: "We would like to know about what you do – are you working now, looking for work, retired, a student, a housewife, or what?" The second alternative measure (Measure 3) defines an individual's year

the analysis in this paper requires the knowledge of each individual's marital status in their year of retirement.

¹⁴ This implies that the allocation of individuals to sub-samples is conditional on the definition of retirement used in the analysis. Thus, sample sizes and summary statistics vary when alternative retirement definitions are used.

of retirement as the first year in which he or she answers “retired” to this question. Many non-employed female respondents report their current work status as “retired” in some years and “housewife” in other years. The third alternative measure (Measure 4) applies only to female respondents and defines their retirement year as the first year in which they answer either “retired” or “housewife” to the current employment status question following a period of employment. The final alternative definition (Measure 5) is based on the pattern of work hours reported over the sample period, and is similar to that used by BSW. The household is considered to be retired if neither the individual nor their spouse (if married) work more than 500 hours in any future years. We also define (for this measure only) a transitional period that includes all years in which the household is not retired by the above definition but neither the individual nor their spouse (if married) work more than 1500 hours.¹⁵

Table 2 compares the various retirement definitions along a few important dimensions. Measures 1 – 4 result in very similar mean retirement ages and work history characteristics. Measure 5, however, is much more restrictive than the other retirement definitions and results in a higher average retirement age and fewer hours worked after retirement for all sub-samples.

VI. Results

We first estimate equation (5) for the log of total food expenditures. Table 3 reports \tilde{a} , the coefficient on $AFTER_{it}$, for three alternative specifications. The control variables in all specifications includes a series of age dummy variables and a series of household size dummy

¹⁵ Bernheim, Skinner, & Weinberg use this definition but limit this transitional period to a maximum of five years for each individual.

variables.¹⁶ Specification (2) also includes a series of dummy variables for the individual's self-reported health status on a five-grade scale.¹⁷ Specification (3) is only estimated for the sub-sample of married couples, includes only the sample years for each couple in which they are married, and adds to the variables in specification (2) a series of dummy variables for the wife's age and wife's self-reported health on the five-grade scale.¹⁸

The results in Table 3 are strikingly consistent. Married couple households reduce food expenditures after the husband's retirement by about 8 percent. This drop is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Single households, however, show no significant declines in consumption and the pooled sample may increase food consumption following retirement.

In Table 4, the models in Table 3 are re-estimated using two-year first-differences¹⁹ rather than a fixed-effect specification. A two year period is chosen because our inability to perfectly line up the retirement date and the consumption measure causes the consumption response to be spread out over two interview periods, and the estimate of $\tilde{\alpha}$ in this case is the percentage change in food expenditure from the year before retirement to the year after retirement. The first-differenced estimates are consistent with the fixed-effects estimates, though fewer observations are available and the standard errors are higher. The basic model yields, once again, an estimated 8 percent drop in food consumption for married couples, and no significant decreases for the single samples.

¹⁶ The husband's age is used for married couples in most specifications. The age dummies range from age 46 to 80+ with individuals <46 serving as the default group. The household size dummies range from 1 member to 7+ members.

¹⁷ Husband's health status is used for married couples. The health status variable is available for household heads and spouses beginning in 1984 and thus the number of observations in each sub-sample, but not the number of households, is greatly reduced when it is included.

¹⁸ Wife's age dummies range from age 41 to 80+ with individuals <41 serving as the default group.

¹⁹ See Hausman and Paquette [1987].

Table 5 reports the results of specification (1) estimated separately for the two components of food expenditure, food consumed at home and food away from home. Changes in the price of time following retirement could lead to a change in the household's food consumption pattern. For example, more time for at-home meal preparation could result in a substitution away from expenditures on food away from home. Alternatively, married couples may substitute restaurant meals for meals at home as they increase joint leisure consumption. We find no support for substitution effects, in fact, the estimated declines in food at home and away from home are remarkably similar for married couples, though the coefficients are more precisely estimated for the food at home category. There are no significant declines in either consumption category for the two single samples; the point estimates are small and often positive, and the coefficients are not precisely estimated.

The model in section III implies that the consumption decline at retirement will be greater when the wife's expected period of widowhood is longer. Taking as given the difference in life expectancy between men and women, the length of this period will be positively related to the age difference between husband and wife. Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation (5) allowing for different age profiles and retirement effects for sub-samples defined by the husband-wife age difference. The coefficient in the first row is the estimated change in consumption for the excluded group, in which husbands are 1 – 4 years older than their spouse. A 6 percent decline in consumption is found for this group. Rows 2 and 3 report the marginal consumption change relative to the excluded group for sub-samples in which the husband is younger or the same age as the wife, and in which the husband is more than 4 years older than

the wife. As hypothesized, the consumption decline is found to be significantly larger for households where the husband is more than 4 years older than the wife, with consumption for this group declining by a total of 16%. Households where the husband is younger or the same age as the wife experience a consumption decline not significantly different from those in the 1 – 4 year age difference sample.

In general, the estimated food consumption equations are consistent with our hypothesis that the retirement consumption drop is associated with changes in the relative bargaining power of husbands and wives. There is no evidence of a consumption decline for single households, either for single men or for a pooled sample of men and women, while the consumption decline for married couples is robust to changes in specification, the inclusion of health and household size indicators, and is common to both food consumed at home and away from home. For married couples, the consumption decline is larger when the husband is substantially older than the wife, and has a desired consumption path that differs more sharply from that of his wife.

VII. Alternative Specifications

If increases in leisure reduce the marginal utility of consumption, then retirement may cause a reduction in food consumption through a simple substitution mechanism. Other researchers have used non-retirement reductions in hours worked to investigate this mechanism and have argued that it cannot explain the entire consumption drop. In this paper, we are concerned with the differential responses of married couples and single households, and so must consider whether leisure-food substitution would accompany the retirement of husbands but not

single men and women. Substitution of time for goods in meal production is a plausible response to the increase in leisure that accompanies retirement, but should be more pronounced when wives retire, rather than husbands, since retired women in our sample cohorts are much more likely to shoulder most of the domestic work of the households.

All previous results for married couples focus on the husband's retirement status. In this section we examine the effects on consumption of the retirement status of both husband and wife. Equation (5) is estimated replacing $RETIRE_{it}$ and $AFTER_{it}$ with the following dummy variables: $RETIREH_{it} = 1$ if the husband retires this year; $RETIREW_{it} = 1$ if the wife retires; $RETIREB_{it} = 1$ in a year that both spouses retire; $AFTERH_{it} = 1$ in all years after the husband is retired, but the wife is not retired; $AFTERW_{it} = 1$ in all year after only the wife is retired; and $AFTERB_{it} = 1$ in all years after both spouses are retired. The sample for this analysis is restricted to married couples in which both husband and wife are at risk of retirement: i.e. the wife retires during the sample period or has at least 13 years of work experience when her husband retires.

Table 7 presents the coefficients on each of the *AFTER* variables in the sequential retirement model. Each coefficient measures the change in household consumption relative to the default category of no one in the household is retired. The wife's retirement does not significantly affect any component of food consumption. After only the husband is retired, there are significant decreases in both total food consumption and food consumed at home. The years in which both spouses are retired are characterized by weaker consumption shortfalls; the level of total food consumption is not significantly different at the 5 percent level from consumption during the years in which both are working. This pattern is consistent with a bargaining story in

which individual bargaining power is affected by retirement, and husbands wish to consume more than wives.

In equation (5), we constrain the effect of retirement on consumption to be equal across all years after retirement. In most specifications, we find a significant drop in consumption for married couples after retirement. However, two alternative patterns might be expected to occur: (1) Consumption gradually decreases after retirement due to changing marginal utility of food consumption; or (2) Consumption drops immediately after retirement but gradually returns to pre-retirement levels. Furthermore, while we find no decrease in consumption after retirement for singles, there may in fact be a temporary decline which is disguised in the main specification. In order to allow for discrete changes in consumption after retirement, we estimate equation (5) for married couples and pooled singles, but replace $AFTER_{it}$ with a series of dummy variables for the first five years after retirement.²⁰ Table 8 presents the coefficient on each of the year-since-retirement dummy variables. The consumption decline for married couples is found to be nearly identical in each of the years after retirement. In none of the years after retirement do we find a drop in consumption for singles.

All of the preceding results are based on retirement measure 1. In Table 9, we experiment with the other retirement definitions, reporting the comparison for only specification (1), though the pattern is similar with alternative sets of controls. There are substantial declines in consumption by married couples for all retirement definitions except for measure 3, which is based on current employment status. As shown in Table 2, married men who are retired by this definition work the most hours after retirement, suggesting that some proportion of those who

²⁰ The effect of retirement on consumption is constrained to be equal from the six year after retirement and on.

report themselves retired one year return to work in subsequent years. The retirement definition based on current reports of employment status appears to be subject to more measurement error, and provides one of the few cases where married couple consumption does not show a significant decline. We also see the only case of an apparent consumption decline for single men using the fifth, and most restrictive, definition of retirement.

Table 10 shows how the post-retirement consumption change varies with selected individual and household characteristics. Specifications (1) and (2) split each sub-sample by the individual's (husband's) retirement age; and (3), (4) and (5) by the value of annual food expenditures per capita, averaged over the entire sample period, as a rough proxy for income.²¹ The post-retirement consumption decline for married couples is larger for households in which the male head retires before the age of 62. Early retirement may be associated with adverse information about health or employment prospects, and so this result lends some credence to the argument that the consumption decline is caused by the arrival of retirement-related bad news.²² However, the consumption decline is large and significant for later retirees as well. Specifications (3) - (5) show that the post-retirement consumption decline for married couples (and the consumption increase for the pooled sample of singles) are strongest in the low-income portion of the sample, but the decline in food expenditures by married couples is also substantial and significant for the middle-income group.²³

²¹ We also split the sample by the husband's birth cohort, and by the marital status of some singles. The results are quite similar for the two birth cohorts: born before 1925 and born in or after 1925. One possible explanation for the absence of a consumption decline among the pooled singles subsample is that the single female group includes widows, whose consumption profile may have been shifted down by the earlier retirement of a now-deceased spouse. However, we find that the continuity of the consumption profile for singles holds for both the widowed and non-widowed groups.

²² Hausman and Paquette find that most men who retire before age 60 do so involuntarily, and that involuntary retirement is associated with larger decreases in food consumption.

²³ This pattern is consistent with the results of Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg

VII. Conclusion

In this paper, we re-examine the consumption decline at retirement using food expenditure data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that the discrete drop in consumption at the retirement of the household head noted by other researchers is restricted to married couple households, and to the retirement of the husband. Single households exhibit either no significant change in their food expenditures at retirement, or a significant increase. These results are robust to alternative specifications of the consumption equation, and alternative definitions of retirement. The contrast between the behavior of single and married households is not consistent with previous explanations of the consumption drop that are based on irrational behavior by individuals, or on the systematic arrival of adverse information at retirement. However, it is consistent with a model of marital bargaining in which wives prefer to save more than their husbands to support an expected longer retirement period, and relative control over household decisions is affected by control over market income. The pattern of the consumption decline, which is increasing in the age gap between husband and wife, lends further support to this interpretation.

References

- Akerlof, George A., "Procrastination and Obedience," *American Economic Review*, May 1991, 81:2, 1-19.
- Attanasio, Orazio P. and Guglielmo Weber, "Is Consumption Growth Consistent with Intertemporal Optimization? Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey," *Journal of Political Economy*, December 1995, 103:6, 1121-1157.
- Aura, Saku, "Does the Balance of Power Within a Family Matter? The Case of the Retirement Equity Act," 2000, MIT.
- Banks, James, Richard Blundell, and Sara Tanner, "Is There a Retirement Savings Puzzle?" *American Economic Review*, September 1998, 88:4, 769-788.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas, Jonathan Skinner, and Steven Weinberg, "What Accounts for the Variation in Retirement Wealth Among Households?" 2000, forthcoming *American Economic Review*.
- Browning, Martin, "The Saving Behavior of a Two-person Household," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 2000, 102:2, 235-251.
- Browning, Martin and Thomas Crossley, "The Life Cycle Model of Consumption and Saving," 2000, forthcoming *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.
- Chiappori, Pierre-André, "Rational Household Labor Supply," *Econometrica*, Vol. 56, No. 1, (January 1988), 63-89.
- Chiappori, Pierre-André, "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 100, No. 3, (June 1992), 437-467.
- Diamond, Peter and Botond Koszegi, "Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement," MIT Working Paper, January 2000.
- Euwals, Rob, Axel Borsch-Supan, and Angelika Eymann, "The Saving Behaviour of Two Person Households: Evidence from Dutch Panel Data," December 2000, IZA Discussion Paper No. 238.
- Hamermesh, Daniel S., "Consumption During Retirement: The Missing Link in the Life Cycle," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, February 1984, 66:1, 1-7.
- Hausman, Jerry A. and Lynn Paquette, "Involuntary Early Retirement and Consumption," in *Work, health, and income among the elderly*, ed. Gary Burtless, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987, pages 151-75.

- Laibson, David, "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 1997, 112, 443-478.
- Lundberg, Shelly, "Family Bargaining and Retirement Behavior," in *Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics*, ed. Henry Aaron, Russell Sage/Brookings, 1999, pp. 253-272.
- Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 101, No. 6, (December 1993), 988-1010.
- Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, "Efficiency in Marriage," February 2001, University of Washington.
- Manser, Marilyn and Murray Brown, "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," *International Economic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (February 1980), 31-44.
- Mariger, Randall P., "A Life-Cycle Consumption Model with Liquidity Constraints: Theory and Empirical Results," *Econometrica*, May 1987, 55:3, 533-557.
- Mazzocco, Maurizio, "Household Intertemporal Behavior: A Collective Characterization and Empirical Tests," 2000, University of Chicago.
- McElroy, Marjorie B. and Mary J. Horney, "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," *International Economic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (June 1981), 333-349.
- Robb, A. L. and J. B. Burbridge, "Consumption, Income, and Retirement," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, August 1989, 22:3, 522-542.

Table 1: Means (Standard Deviations) Of Sub-Sample Characteristics^a

	Married Couples	Single Men	Single Women	Pooled Singles
Observations	4348	401	1394	1795
Households	391	36	126	162
Total Food Expenditures	\$4644 (2322)	\$3453 (1870)	\$2526 (1781)	\$2733 (1842)
Food At Home	\$3635 (1923)	\$2293 (1431)	\$2050 (1542)	\$2104 (1521)
Food Away From Home	\$1010 (1061)	\$1161 (1066)	\$477 (688)	\$629 (838)
Age	60.7 (7.1)	59.9 (6.4)	62.5 (7.7)	62.0 (7.5)
Age At Retirement	61.9 (5.1)	61.2 (4.6)	63.8 (5.9)	63.3 (5.8)
Years Of Work Experience Before Retirement	41.3 (6.3)	40.6 (5.6)	28.8 (12.7)	31.5 (12.5)
Household Size				
= 1	2%	53%	66%	63%
= 2	62%	32%	25%	26%
= 3	21%	11%	5%	7%
>= 4	15%	4%	4%	4%
Health Status:				
Excellent	8%	5%	6%	6%
Very Good	16%	17%	16%	17%
Good	19%	18%	18%	18%
Fair	10%	12%	11%	11%
Poor	4%	3%	5%	5%
Missing	44%	45%	44%	44%

^a Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement using the main retirement definition (i.e. highest reported retrospective retirement year). All samples include only the observations used in the regression analysis (i.e. total food consumption is greater than zero and retirement status changes during the sample period). For the married couple sub-sample, all non-household level variables are summarized for the husband.

Table 2: Characteristics Using Alternative Measures Of Retirement^a

	Measure 1	Measure 2	Measure 3	Measure 4	Measure 5
Retirement Age					
Married Couples	62.0	61.7	62.2		65.3
Single Men	61.2	61.2	62.7		64.4
Single Women	64.0	63.3	64.7	62.5	64.2
Pooled Singles	63.4	62.9	64.4	62.5	64.3
Years Of Full-Time Work Before Retirement					
Married Couples	39.5	39.5	39.5		40.8
Single Men	36.6	36.6	37.7		36.0
Single Women	22.5	23.3	18.3	22.5	23.7
Pooled Singles	25.6	26.4	21.3	25.6	26.7
Average Hours Worked In 5 Years After Retirement					
Married Couples	289	300	339		15
Single Men	292	307	154		20
Single Women	162	163	167	291	23
Pooled Singles	197	196	165	266	22
Maximum Hours Worked After Retirement					
Married Couples	558	575	583		38
Single Men	551	568	357		56
Single Women	407	421	376	587	46
Pooled Singles	441	456	373	542	49
Households					
Married Couples	391	379	421		357
Single Men	36	34	35		40
Single Women	126	117	191	136	128
Pooled Singles	162	151	226	171	168

^a Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement and only households which retire during the sample period are included. Each household is counted only once when calculating summary statistics in this table.

Measure 1: After highest reported year of retirement (retrospective)

Measure 2: After lowest reported year of retirement (retrospective)

Measure 3: After first reported employment status = retired

Measure 4: After first reported employment status = retired or housewife (if ever employed)

Measure 5: Neither head nor spouse ever work >500 hours again

Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption For Married and Single Households^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
(1) All Specifications Control For Age, Household Size & Year Of Retirement	0.100 (1.07)	0.092 (1.97)*	-0.085 (4.27)**
Observations	401	1795	4348
Individuals	36	162	391
(2) Adds Health Status	-0.028 (0.22)	0.108 (1.62)	-0.073 (2.63)**
Observations	221	1003	2440
Individuals	35	159	383
(3) Adds Wife's Age & Health Status. Includes Only Years When Married			-0.081 (2.90)**
Observations			2373
Individuals			381

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All variables for married couples refer to the husband.

Table 4: Two Year Differenced Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption For Married and Single Households^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
(1) All Specifications Control For Age, Household Size	-0.018 (0.13)	0.061 (0.92)	-0.084 (2.77)**
Observations	132	584	1438
Individuals	36	162	388
(2) Adds Health Status	-0.584 (1.38)	0.068 (0.62)	-0.059 (1.14)
Observations	46	201	515
Individuals	33	142	348
(3) Adds Wife's Age & Health Status. Includes Only Years When Married			-0.085 (1.59)
Observations			495
Individuals			339

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All variables for married couples refer to the husband.

Table 5: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Food Consumed At Home and Away From Home For Married and Single Households^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

FOOD CONSUMED AT HOME	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
(1) All Specifications Control For Age, Household Size & Year Of Retirement	0.094 (0.99)	0.048 (1.02)	-0.078 (3.60)**
Observations	398	1781	4340
Individuals	36	162	391
(2) Adds Health Status	-0.065 (0.47)	0.017 (0.26)	-0.075 (2.43)*
Observations	220	994	2436
Individuals	35	159	383
(3) Adds Wife's Age & Health Status. Includes Only Years When Married			-0.084 (2.79)**
Observations			2369
Individuals			381
FOOD CONSUMED AWAY FROM HOME	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
(1) All Specifications Control For Age, Household Size & Year Of Retirement	0.155 (0.87)	0.137 (1.35)	-0.100 (2.07)*
Observations	402	1819	4355
Individuals	36	162	391
(2) Adds Health Status	0.352 (1.18)	0.275 (1.86)	-0.073 (1.07)
Observations	221	1015	2444
Individuals	35	159	383
(3) Adds Wife's Age & Health Status. Includes Only Years When Married			-0.099 (1.44)
Observations			2377
Individuals			381

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All variables for married couples refer to the husband.

Table 6: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption For Married Couples By Their Difference In Age^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Total Food Consumption
(1) Husband Is 1 - 4 Years Older Than Wife	-0.058 (2.02)*
(2) Husband Is Younger Or Same Age As Wife: Relative To (1)	0.003 (0.06)
(3) Husband Is More Than 4 Years Older Than Wife: Relative To (1)	-0.098 (2.03)*
Observations	4193
Individuals	389

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). The model controls for age, wife's age, household size & year of retirement. The sample includes for each couple only the sample years in which they are married. Only the marital spell in which the husband retires is included for husbands with multiple marriage spells during the sample period.

Table 7: Fixed Effects Model Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption, Food Consumed At Home, and Food Consumed Away From Home For Husbands and Wives^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Total Food Consumption	Food Consumed At Home	Food Consumed Away From Home
Only Husband Is Retired	-0.073 (3.08)**	-0.077 (3.03)**	-0.072 (1.21)
Only Wife Is Retired	-0.026 (0.94)	-0.020 (0.67)	0.070 (1.01)
Both Spouses Are Retired	-0.052 (1.81)	-0.059 (1.91)	0.066 (0.91)
Observations	3813	3810	3819
Individuals	354	354	354

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined separately for husbands and wives as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). Each coefficient measures the change in household consumption relative to the default category of no one in the household is retired. All specifications control for both spouse's age and year of retirement, and household size. The sample includes for each couple only the sample years in which they are married. Only couples where the wife is at risk of retirement are included (Wife's work experience ≥ 13 years). Husbands with multiple marriage spells during the sample period are excluded.

Table 8: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change (Discrete) In Log Of Total Food Consumption^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
Year Of Retirement	0.068 (1.25)	-0.030 (1.40)
One Year After Retirement	0.044 (0.73)	-0.087 (3.63)**
Two Years After Retirement	0.122 (1.83)	-0.085 (3.18)**
Three Years After Retirement	0.064 (0.84)	-0.076 (2.60)**
Four Years After Retirement	0.127 (1.49)	-0.073 (2.30)*
Five Years After Retirement	0.205 (2.24)*	-0.075 (2.13)*
More Than Five Years After Retirement	0.125 (1.33)	-0.061 (1.69)
Observations	1527	4252
Individuals	162	391

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Year after retirement is defined relative to the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). All specifications control for age, wife's age (for couples), & household size. Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All sub-samples include only the sample years for individuals or couples in which they have the same marital status as in their retirement year. All variables for married couples refer to the husband.

Table 9: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption For Alternative Measures Of Retirement^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
Measure 1: Highest Reported Retirement Year (Retrospective)	0.100 (1.07)	0.092 (1.97)*	-0.085 (4.27)**
Observations	401	1795	4348
Individuals	36	162	391
Measure 2: Earliest Reported Retirement Year (Retrospective)	0.148 (1.51)	0.074 (1.56)	-0.065 (3.24)**
Observations	383	1691	4236
Individuals	34	151	379
Measure 3: After First Reported Employment Status = Retired	0.031 (0.28)	0.047 (1.15)	-0.036 (1.82)
Observations	383	2438	4586
Individuals	35	226	421
Measure 4: After First Reported Employed Status = Retired or Housewife (If Ever Employed)		0.069 (1.46)	
Observations		1781	
Individuals		171	
Measure 5: Neither Head Nor Spouse Work >500 Hours Again	-0.206 (1.82)	-0.057 (1.10)	-0.059 (2.33)*
Observations	423	1815	3773
Individuals	40	168	357

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a All specifications control for age, household size & year of retirement. Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All variables for married couples refer to the husband. When using measure 5, an additional control variable is added for all transition years where neither the head nor spouse work >1500 hours.

Table 10: Fixed Effects Estimates Of The Post-Retirement Change In Log Of Total Food Consumption By Retirement Age and Average Consumption^a

(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)

	Single Men	Pooled Singles	Married Couples
(1) Retirement Age < 62	0.036 (0.16)	0.176 (1.52)	-0.168 (5.05)**
Observations	154	447	1764
Individuals	19	54	161
(2) Retirement Age >= 62	-0.031 (0.21)	0.071 (1.13)	-0.075 (2.42)*
Observations	146	1080	2488
Individuals	17	108	230
(3) Households With Average Annual Consumption Per Capita < \$1000	-1.731 (0.88)	0.153 (1.01)	-0.158 (2.26)*
Observations	28	312	675
Individuals	3	32	62
(4) Households With Average Annual Consumption Per Capita >= \$1000 & <= \$2000	0.033 (0.25)	0.135 (2.19)*	-0.067 (3.08)**
Observations	158	911	2798
Individuals	20	98	254
(5) Households With Average Annual Consumption Per Capita > \$2000	-0.093 (0.49)	-0.169 (1.88)	-0.058 (1.12)
Observations	114	304	779
Individuals	13	32	75

* Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.

^a Retirement is defined as all years after the highest reported year of retirement (retrospective). All specifications control for age, wife's age (for couples), household size & year of retirement. Sub-samples are defined by marital status at retirement. All sub-samples include only the sample years for individuals or couples in which they have the same marital status as in their retirement year. All variables for married couples refer to the husband.

Appendix: Not for publication

Re-write the problem without commitment

$$\begin{aligned} \max & (1 - \mu_1) [T_1 U(C_1) + T_2 U(C_2)] + \mu_1 [T_1 U(C_1) + T_2 U(C_2) + T_3 U(C_3)] \\ \text{s.t. } & U'(C_2) = \mu_2 U'(C_3) \\ & T_3 C_3 = A_2 - T_2 C_2 \\ & A_2 = (Y - C_1) T_1 \end{aligned}$$

as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = & [T_1 U(C_1) + T_2 U(C_2)] + \mu_1 T_3 U\left(\frac{(Y - C_1) T_1 - T_2 C_2}{T_3}\right) \\ & - \lambda \left[U'(C_2) - \mu_2 U'\left(\frac{(Y - C_1) T_1 - T_2 C_2}{T_3}\right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

The first-order conditions are:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_1} &= T_1 U'_1 + \mu_1 T_3 U'_3 \frac{-T_1}{T_3} + \lambda \mu_2 U''_3 \frac{-T_1}{T_3} = 0 \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_2} &= T_2 U'_2 + \mu_1 T_3 U'_3 \frac{-T_2}{T_3} - \lambda \left(U''_2 - \mu_2 U''_3 \frac{-T_2}{T_3} \right) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

These can be re-written as

$$\begin{aligned} U'_1 &= \mu_1 U'_3 + \lambda \mu_2 U''_3 \frac{1}{T_3} \\ U'_2 &= \mu_1 U'_3 + \lambda \mu_2 U''_3 \frac{1}{T_3} + \lambda U''_2 \frac{1}{T_2} \end{aligned}$$

Combine these to get

$$U'_2 = U'_1 + \lambda U''_2 \frac{1}{T_2}$$

Since $U'' < 0$, $U'_2 > U'_1$ iff $\lambda < 0$. Thus to show that $U'_2 > U'_1$, and therefore $C_2 < C_1$, we need to show that $\lambda < 0$. We can rewrite the second f.o.c. as

$$U'_2 = \mu_1 U'_3 + \lambda \left(\mu_2 U''_3 \frac{1}{T_3} + U''_2 \frac{1}{T_2} \right)$$

Substituting the first constraint, $U'(C_2) = \mu_2 U'(C_3)$, into the f.o.c. we get

$$\mu_2 U'_3 = \mu_1 U'_3 + \lambda \left(\mu_2 U''_3 \frac{1}{T_3} + U''_2 \frac{1}{T_2} \right)$$

Since $\mu_2 > \mu_1$ and the last parenthetical term is negative, then $\lambda < 0$ and $C_2 < C_1$.